pproved F	or	Release 20	07/07/05 :	CIA-RDF	P88B0044	3R0011038	90085
أجلية	LINI	CLASSIFIED		CONCEN	TIAL	SECRET	- 1
<u> </u>	.014	CLASSIFIED		LONGLIN	IIAL	1 SECKET	- 1
		EVEC		e obe t/	ADIATA A		
		EAEC	UTIVE S	CCRETA . cl:			
			Nouting	, эцр		0	
TO:			ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL	***
	1	DCI					
	2	DDCI					
	3	D/DCI/RM					
	4	DD/NFA					
	5	D/DCI/CT					
]	6	DD/A					
	7	DD/O					j
	8	DD/S&T					
	9	GC					
	10	LC					\$:
	11	IG					
	12	Compt					
1	13	D/PA					
1	14	D/EE0					
1	15	D/PPPM					1
1	16	AO/DCI					
-	17	PB/NSC					*
	18	***					
<u> </u>	19						
	20						
L	21						
L	22	CHERENICE					
	-	SUSPENSE		Date	_		ì
Remarks	 -						
						ILLEGIB	
			· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·		Evan	utive Secretary	
						•	27
3637 (12-77)					22 September 1991 d		

Approved For Release 2007/07/05 : CIA-RDP88B00443R001103890085-0



TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank—TOP SECRET when attached to Top Secret Document—Automatically downgraded or declassified when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION	REGISTRY
SOURCE	CIA CONTROL NO. TS810264
DDI DOC. NO. TS810264 DOC. DATE 22 September 1981	DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED 22 September 198
COPY NO. 2 NUMBER OF PAGES 2	LOGGED BY ER/las
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS O	

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECE IVED				ASED	SEEN BY		
OFFICE.	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE	OFFICE/DIV.	DATE
DCI								
					*			
		-						

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

D	OWNGRADED	DE	STROYED	DISPATCHE	DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)		
то		BY (Signature)		то			
BY (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (S	ignature)	BY (Signature)			
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE		

FORM 26 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

22 September 1981

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence MEMORANDUM FOR:

Chairman, National Intelligence Council

Director, Office of Policy and Planning

FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Draft SNIE 11-4/2-81, Foreign Reactions to

US Strategic Force Improvements

- 1. It seems to me that the SNIE 11-4/2-81 has become unwieldy and out of focus.
- 2. One of the things that makes it unwieldy is the structure which requires a reader to plough through twenty pages on foreign reactions. Much of this could be at the end rather than at the beginning because it is the least interesting and important and the most obvious and ephemeral part of the document. Put at the beginning it imparts to the whole document a wishy-washy quality. It should also be made more concise.
- 3. The estimate seems to have somehow gravitated away from it's original concept that was to produce a document which would evaluate Soviet strategic capabilities, both offensive and defensive. It was to include existing Soviet capabilities, programmed capabilities, changes in Soviet programs which U.S. choices might stimulate, Soviet technological capability to make changes to offset U.S. choices and the burden this would put on Soviet resources and decision making. It was to provide a panorama of Soviet capabilities, existing and latent, and thus provide an estimate against which the wisdom and efficacy of U.S. alternatives might be measured. I think the original document met that requirement and in NSC discussions it was presented as an evaluation of Soviet capabilities against which U.S. alternatives might be measured. For example, Weinberger and Carlucci found the Soviet capability to improve the accuracy and increase the number of its warheads important in evaluating the value of the multiple basing system. They found the weakness of the Soviet air defense against lower altitude weapons and the time which it would take to reliably correct that as a basis for increased reliance on the cruise missile in narrowing the so-called window of opportunity. In the listing of technologies, systems applications, their military value and timetables to implement (pages 32-35) are similarly of value in weighing and making decisions on U.S. weapons. In this context we are clearly not intruding into the net assessment area. As the estimate evolved away from emphasis on Soviet capabilities into estimating how the Soviets would react, rather than how they could react, it got to look more like a net estimate. This may be a fine distinction

TOP SECRET TS810264

25X1

- 2 -

but I think it is a real one in applying the rules and in the value and credibility of the estimate.

for William J. Casey

25X1

TOP SECRET

25X1